EU CSA Regulation (Chat Control 2.0)

European Union2022/0155(COD)Updated October 20, 2026

50%of the way to law
Bad for your rightsIn progress
  1. Proposed
  2. Parliament position
  3. Trilogue
  4. Adopted

Negotiations ongoing; scanning of private messages still unresolved after six rounds

The permanent plan to mandate scanning of private messages in Europe. Six negotiation rounds have not settled the central question: suspicionless scanning of private and encrypted communications.

Latest update

Council officials met on a possible detection package

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The bill

Read the full billOfficial bill record

Key facts

Where
European Union
Bill number
2022/0155(COD)
Status
In progress
Threat
High
Last update
October 20, 2026

Topics

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What it does

The proposed CSA Regulation would let authorities issue detection orders forcing services to scan private communications for abuse material, with the reach into end-to-end encryption as the central fight. Parliament's November 2023 mandate drew the lines: no scanning of encrypted services, judicial warrants, no suspicionless scanning. The Council deadlocked for two years until Germany's 2025 shift against mandatory suspicionless scanning broke the logjam toward a softened position built on voluntary detection, endorsed in November 2025. Five trilogue rounds between December 2025 and June 2026 failed to close the gap, the Council's own Legal Service told member states in June that suspicionless scanning of private communications is still unlawful under the current text, and the fifth round collapsed on June 29 over permanent suspicionless scanning. The Irish presidency held a sixth round on September 29, set aside for detection obligations. Negotiators agreed on the tasks of the new EU Centre, and press reports say they also agreed in principle on detection orders for public content on large platforms. Detection in private messages, the core of the fight, stayed open. National officials met again in October on what the Council calls a possible detection package, and MLex reports compromise texts are due November 3 ahead of political talks on December 8, dates the Council has not published.

What’s at stake

This is the West's central fight over whether private communication survives. Whatever text emerges becomes the global template: a mandate here is cited in Washington and London within the year. And the voluntary regime of Chat Control 1.0 runs alongside as the ratchet, keeping scanning normalized while the permanent version is negotiated.

Our take

Four years in, nobody has explained how you scan encrypted messages without breaking encryption for everyone, because there is no answer. The Council's own lawyers say suspicionless scanning of private messages is still unlawful under the current text. The September round shows the method: settle the easy parts, the agency and public posts, and leave private messages for last, so the pressure to close the file lands on the one question that matters. The interim regime stays alive in the meantime, and the Council's label for the scanning is still voluntary, the same label the 1.0 regime has carried since 2021.

Timeline

  1. Council officials met on a possible detection packageLatest

  2. Sixth trilogue: EU Centre tasks agreed; detection in private messages left open (a deal in principle on public content is reported by the press)

  3. Fifth trilogue round failed over permanent suspicionless scanning

  4. Council Legal Service told member states that suspicionless scanning of private communications is still unlawful under the current text

  5. Trilogue negotiations began; four rounds through May without agreement

  6. Council negotiating mandate agreed at COREPER, built on voluntary scanning

  7. Germany came out against mandatory scanning, forcing Denmark to drop detection orders

  8. Council vote pulled after the blocking minority held

  9. Parliament's civil liberties committee adopted its position: no scanning of encrypted services, judicial warrants required (confirmed by plenary November 22)

  10. Proposed by the European Commission

The record

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European Commission