Stop the EU's Plan to Read Every Message
They call it Chat Control. In practice it means scanning private messages in advance and without suspicion, for the 450 million people in the EU and anyone who messages them.
Join the MovementWhat Is Chat Control?
The proposal turns private communication into material that can be inspected before it is sent.
The inspection happens before encryption can protect the message.
More detail
Chat Control is the nickname for a set of EU proposals that would require or permit messaging services to scan the content of your private communications, your messages, photos and links, searching for child sexual abuse material and signs of grooming.
That sounds narrow, but it is not. To scan messages that are end-to-end encrypted, the scanning has to happen on your own device, before your message is encrypted and sent. That is called client-side scanning, and it means the confidential channel between you and the person you are talking to is no longer confidential. Software on your phone inspects what you write and reports it. The reach also goes past the EU's borders: the services it targets are global, and scanning a conversation scans everyone in it, including whoever is on the other end outside Europe.
There are two versions on the table, and they are not the same thing. Chat Control 1.0 is already law. Chat Control 2.0 is still being fought over. Which one wins decides how far the scanning goes.
Chat Control 1.0 vs 2.0
| Aspect | Chat Control 1.0 | Chat Control 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| Official name | Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, readopted in 2026 as Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 | The CSA Regulation (CSAR) |
| Legal status | Temporary derogation from the ePrivacy rules. Already in force. | A proposed permanent EU regulation. Still being negotiated. |
| Scanning | Voluntary. Providers may choose to scan. | Detection can be compelled. Governments pushed broad duties; Parliament wants only court-ordered, suspect-targeted scanning. |
| Who scans now | Mainly unencrypted US services: Gmail, Messenger, Skype, Snapchat, iCloud Mail, Xbox. | Potentially every messaging, email and chat provider operating in the EU. |
| Encryption | Does not scan end-to-end encrypted chats. A carve-out for them was added in July 2026. | Client-side scanning would break end-to-end encryption. Governments keep pushing to bring mandatory scanning back, and encrypted apps remain squarely in the firing line. |
| Age checks | Not addressed. | Age-verification obligations on services, including encrypted apps, pushed by the Council. |
| Detection orders | None. The regime is voluntary. | Government-issued orders. Parliament demands a judge and a named suspect; member-state governments do not. |
| Duration | Extended until April 2028. | Permanent once adopted. |
| Status (October 2026) | Revived on July 9, 2026 despite 314 MEPs voting to end it. | Six trilogue rounds. The EU Centre's tasks are agreed; scanning of private messages is still unresolved. |
Chat Control 1.0 was the foot in the door: temporary, voluntary and limited to a handful of mostly American services that were already scanning unencrypted traffic. Chat Control 2.0 is the endgame: a permanent regulation that could force every provider to scan, reach into encrypted apps, and tie it all to mandatory age checks.
1.0 normalized the idea. 2.0 tries to make it law.
It Breaks Encryption for Everyone
Scanning before encryption creates a route around the protection that encryption is supposed to provide.
More detail
Encryption protects everyone's data: your bank details, medical records, work, family photos, and your own government's communications. End-to-end encryption means only you and the person you are talking to can read a message, not the platform, a hacker, or a hostile state.
Client-side scanning breaks that promise at the source. Once your device is required to inspect your messages and flag them, a backdoor exists. And a backdoor does not check ID. What is built to look for illegal images can be repurposed, expanded, or exploited by anyone who gains access: criminals, foreign intelligence services, or a future government with a longer list of things to look for.
The industry is already reacting. Signal and other secure messengers have said they would leave the EU rather than compromise their encryption. The engineers who build these systems are telling lawmakers the same thing every independent cryptographer does: you cannot weaken encryption for one purpose without weakening it for all.
The threat keeps coming back. Whenever the negotiations stall, member-state governments push to put mandatory detection, and client-side scanning with it, back on the table. The last round of talks collapsed because governments would not give up suspicionless scanning. The encryption exemption won in July is narrow and can be reversed in the next round.
Everyone Becomes a Suspect
Automated scanning puts innocent conversations into investigative systems while offenders move elsewhere.
More detail
The premise of Chat Control is that the private messages of hundreds of millions of law-abiding people should be searched, continuously, on the chance that a few contain something illegal. That is the definition of mass surveillance, and it is exactly the kind of suspicionless, general search that free societies have always refused to allow in the physical world.
It also fails on its own terms. Automated detection floods investigators with false positives:
- Family beach photos and holiday snapshots flagged as suspicious.
- Consensual messages between teenagers swept up and reported.
- Medical images sent to a doctor treated as evidence.
How We Got Here
How to Argue Back
When they say: "It's only about catching child abusers."
Everyone wants children protected. The method is the problem. Scanning everyone's private messages to find a few offenders is like opening everyone's post every day on the chance of finding something. It treats 450 million innocent people as suspects, floods police with false alarms, and misses the organized offenders who use tools these systems cannot see.
Targeted, judge-authorized investigations catch criminals. Mass scanning catches your holiday photos.
When they say: "If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear."
When they say: "They're only scanning for known illegal images."
When they say: "Encryption stays safe, they promised."
When they say: "It's a targeted, proportionate measure."
When they say: "Other countries are already doing this."
What actually protects children:
Take Action
Chat Control 2.0 is decided by the European Parliament and by your national government in the Council. Both answer to you. Tell your MEP to defend private, encrypted communication.
Contact Your Lawmaker
Reach the people writing these laws. Choose your country and contact your representatives directly.
Email Your MEP
Dear [MEP NAME],
I am a constituent from [COUNTRY], writing about the proposed Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, known as Chat Control.
I urge you to reject any obligation to scan the content of private messages, including client-side scanning of end-to-end encrypted services. Encryption protects the security of every citizen, business, hospital and public authority in the Union. A scanning mechanism built into our own devices is a backdoor, and a backdoor cannot be limited to a single purpose or a single authority.
Please defend strong encryption and oppose mandatory detection.
Sincerely,
[NAME]
