Europe’s Digital ID Wallet Arrives This Year. The "Privacy" Arrives Later. Maybe.

The future of proving who you are comes with a conspicuously unfinished privacy story.

A blue wallet holding a red card attached by a dotted red string to a red target bullseye icon.

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The European Union’s Digital Identity (eID) Wallet is supposed to be a digital equivalent of a physical wallet – containing payment cards, driver’s licenses, and other documents. But it is also designed to offer more than that – namely, it will be a way to log in to websites and apps with a single digital ID.

EU law says that member states must offer every citizen this digital wallet by the end of 2026. The Commission’s policy page puts it like this: “The framework mandates Member States to provide EU Digital Identity (eID) Wallets to citizens by the end of 2026.”

The Commission’s own website dedicated to the digital wallet tells people to “Discover the many ways that EU Digital Identity Wallets will protect your privacy and security” and says the wallets “will protect your privacy and ensure you get to decide how your data” is used.

Now, cryptographers are saying that the first version of the digital ID scheme may not live up to these promises.

The deadline for member countries to start offering the wallet means that the first version is the one that Europeans will get. And, according to IEEE Spectrum, that will not be the private and secure solution that the Commission has been advertising.

The report looks into how the digital wallet is designed to work, and how it might fail to protect its users’ privacy. For example, when a website asks for proof of age, the digital wallet can show only that – that the user is over 18, for example – without revealing the date of birth. But the website still gets to keep the digital signature that verified this piece of information, and other identifiers that can be used to track people.

While the law says that should not happen, it may, because two different websites can compare their records and figure out that the same person visited them, even if they don’t know who that person is.

Anna Lysyanskaya, a computer science professor at Brown University, explained that even if a person had multiple credentials, the government office that issues them would know who has which, and that information could be used to link those credentials back to one person.

Lysyanskaya was among 16 cryptographers who in June 2024 sent feedback to the Commission, warning that some of the design elements of the EU Digital Identity (EUDI) fell short of the privacy requirements. The letter said that without the ability to make sure that people cannot be followed as they use their digital credentials, one entity could “trace this user’s activities throughout the system and observe everywhere the user has been, like a virtual stalker.”

That is something the EU’s own rules say should not happen. Regulation 2024/1183 states that the technical framework of the digital wallet must not let issuers “or any other party, after the issuance of the attestation of attributes, to obtain data that allows transactions or user behaviour to be tracked, linked or correlated” unless the user explicitly allows it.

While the law sets the desired outcome, it does not specify how it should be achieved from the cryptography point of view. And the technical rulebook, known as the Architecture and Reference Framework, says that one feature “SHOULD be implemented using a Zero-Knowledge Proof mechanism.”

This is a weak “should” – and the document does not require the use of zero-knowledge proofs, which would let a person prove that their digital ID credential is valid without revealing the signature that makes visits to websites and apps linkable.

The only thing that is mandatory is that the digital wallet can show only the information that a website or app needs to see, and nothing more. But as Lysyanskaya explained, “now anybody you’ve ever interacted with has some kind of way of tracking you.”

The EU’s “roadmap” mentions zero-knowledge proofs as a future development, but does not require member countries to implement them from the start. The Commission's GitHub page says that “there is currently no clear, certifiable approach agreed at EU level.”

It’s also important to note that the EU’s standalone age-verification app, the subject of our recent feature on age checks, is a separate document that since September 1 requires the use of zero-knowledge proofs as the preferred method, while also mandating a plain fallback for phones that cannot do them. But the general digital wallet has no such requirement at all.

There is division among the experts about how to proceed with the rollout of the wallets, given that the first version may not be the privacy-friendly product the EU promises. Jaap-Henk Hoepman of Radboud University in the Netherlands thinks the use of zero-knowledge proofs should be made mandatory by law, to prevent sites from downgrading to the old, linkable method.

Johannes Schönrich of the FIM Research Center in Augsburg, on the other hand, wants the rollout of the wallet to go ahead, and suggests that a binding timeline should be set for a second version that will include zero-knowledge proofs. Hoepman is not optimistic about this, saying that businesses will not move to a second version because it will cost them money, and that once they build systems around the first version, it will be hard to change.

Even if a second version is developed, Lysyanskaya notes that some users will never update unless forced to, so the first version has to be “private enough.”

Meanwhile, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has been warning that even the privacy-preserving age tokens will leave a central issuer – which “could track every time that credential is used, creating a dangerous trail of metadata on any user they wanted to target.”

EFF also noted that this approach “centralizes critical internet infrastructure in the hands of very few actors.”

In a recent interview, Lysyanskaya said that if the digital ID scheme becomes “really ubiquitous” – and given its purpose, it is likely to – “then unless we place a tremendous amount of trust in both issuers and verifiers to guard our privacy, we may encounter a situation where everybody knows at all times what everybody else is up to, by just leaving these little digital crumbs of information about yourself.”

The law says that using the digital ID “shall be voluntary” – and yet, as we have reported, the EU’s anti-money laundering authority wants it to be “used wherever possible” by banks.

The German government has already passed a law that will make the digital ID scheme the country’s digital ID from January 2, 2027 – without implementing a key component of the EU’s own rules, the possibility for citizens to use a pseudonym.

The European Commission’s own digital ID website, meanwhile, continues to advertise the scheme as something that “will protect your privacy and ensure you get to decide how your data is used.”

The way the first version of the scheme is designed, that is simply not true.

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